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THE OBLIGATION OF SECURING A SPEEDY TRIAL
A speedy trial in criminal law,' as secured by constitutional guaranties, is a trial conducted according to fixed rules, regulations and proceedings of law, free from unreasonable delay.2 The provision in the
Constitution of the United States is found in the Sixth Amendment, and
reads as follows: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, . . .and to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense." Most states have provisions in their constitutions
relating to speedy trials. The Wyoming constitution, which is very similar
to the federal constitution in this respect, provides that "In all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall have the right .. .to a speedy trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to
have been committed." 3 Many states (including Wyoming) further
provide by statute that if a person shall not be brought to trial before a
certain term of court following the filing of the charge against him, he
4
shall be entitled to discharge.
The purpose of this note is to determine who has the burden or
obligation of securing this speedy trial guaranteed in our federal constitution and in most state constitutions. Assuming that a person has been arrested for a felony and that an information has been filed against him, who has
the burden of proceeding without undue delay to the trial in fulfillment
of the constitutional and statutory provisions?
Some courts have for various reasons put the burden on the defendant.
One reason for doing this is based on the proposition that the right is a
privilege of the defendant, and if this right is not claimed by him it may
be waived. 5 In the McTague case the defendant was indicted by the
grand jury for murder, burglary, grand larcency, and for the possession
of burglary tools. The defendant was arraigned and tried on the murder
count and was convicted of murder in the third degree and sentenced to
the state penitentiary. Five years after the indictment against the defendant the other three charges were placed on the calendar for trial. The
defendant contended that he had been denied a speedy trial, but the
court held that he must demand a speedy trial or it is waived.
Another rationale has been that legislatures have indicated that a
demand by defendant was necessary to start the operation of the constitu1.
2.
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4.
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85 Am. St. Rep. 187 has a very good monographic treatment of the general subject.
Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed. (1951).
Wyo. Const. Art I, § 10 (1890).
E.g., Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 10-1312 (1945): "If any person indicted for any offense
and committed to prison, shall not be brought to trial before the end of the second
term of court having jurisdiction of the offense, which shall be held after such
indictment is found, he shall be entitled to be discharged so far as relates to the
offense for which he was committed, unless the delay shall happen on the application of the prisoner." This statute is typical of many statutory provisions. Wyo.
Comp. Stat. § 10-1313 also provides that the accused if out on bail is entitled to
discharge if not brought to trial before the third term of court.
State v. McTague, 173 Minn. 153, 216 N.W. 787 (1927).
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tional guaranty.6 Thus in the Foster case where the defendant was tried
for criminal syndicalism and had been on bail for eight years because the
jury disagreed, the defendant was held not to have been denied a speedy
trial because no formal demand was made or filed in open court by the
defendant.
That the accused is represented adequately by counsel and that counsel
should protect his constitutional rights or the accused should ask that his
rights be taken care of is another basis for putting the burden on the
defendant. 7 The burden has also been placed on the defendant because
of special circumstances. For example in one case s the court reasoned
that with the defendant out on bail there was no valid reason for him to
complain of the delay.
In general the underlying philosophy of placing the burden on the
defendant is that the primary object is to serve the ends of public justice,
and that this is more important than having one particular defendant
in a particular case be discharged or relieved from trial because there was
delay. This philosophy was well summarized in the dissenting opinion in
the Flanary case, 9 "Constitutional and statutory provisions for a 'speedy
trial' secure that right to a defendant, but they were never intended to
defeat the demands of public justice. The prime consideration of such
provisions is justice both to the accused and the public. They were intended to promote prompt trials, not to furnish an escape from trial
through deceit or trickery."
The principal method of putting the burden on the accused has been
the requirement that the defendant must demand trial or he has waived
his right to a speedy trial; this proposition is the prevailing view among
most jurisdictions. 10
In some jurisdictions the burden has been placed on the prosecution
or state. In a recent case 1 the New York Court of Appeals enumerated
several reasons for placing the burden on the prosecution: First, since the
state starts the action and must see that the defendant is promptly arraigned, the state should therefore have the duty of bringing the defendant to
trial in a speedy manner. 12 Secondly, the New York statutes do not permit
the defendant to bring the indictment on for trial, which is true of most
statutory provisions. In the third place, the court reasoned, even though
guilty parties may sometimes be discharged of a crime under statutes which
6.
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People v. Foster, 261 Mich. 247, 246 N.W. 60 (1933).
In re Van Garner, 134 Kan. 410, 5 P.2d 821 (1931).
Meadowcroft v. People, 163 Ill. 56, 45 N.E. 991 (1896).
Flanary v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 204, 35 S.E.2d 135, 139 (1945).
People v. Foster, 261 Mich. 247, 246 N.W. 60 (1933); Head v. State, 9 Okla. Crim.
356, 151 Pac. 937 (1913) ; Fox v. State, 102 Ark. 393, 144 S.W. 516 (1912) .
People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 130 N.E.2d 891 (1955).
As the Supreme Court of Arizona put it in State v. Carillo, 41 Ariz. 170, 16 P.2d 965.
(1952), "The defendant wasn't the moving party . . . the state initiates the
accusation and any delay . . . except for the most cogent reasons is not contemplated or justifiable."
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require either trial or dismissal within a limited period, the right of all
defendants to a speedy trial is more important than whether a particular
defendant is guilty or innocent of a particular charge against him. The
decision in the Prosser case definitely placed the burden on the prosecution
of noticing defendant's case for trial. The court observed that the district
attorney could at any time have placed the case on the calendar for trial,
which would counter the danger of the defendant sitting in silence and
then obtaining a discharge by claming that his speedy trial right has been
violated.
In further support of the view that the burden is upon the prosecution,
the Virginia court' 3 reasoned that if the silence of the accused were intended
to be a waiver of the right to a speedy trial the legislature could have
expressed this by appropriate statutory language. Another approach is
that the defendant is not required to make any demand because that
demand is made for him by the "speedy trial" provisions of the constitution. 14 The Supreme Court of Oregon simply put it that the prosecutor
has a duty in the absence of statute to speedily bring the accused to triala duty which is just as imperative as the duty to charge the person with
the crime in the first place.'S Similarly, because there was no statutory
duty placed on the defendant to demand a trial, the burden was placed
on the state in a West Virginia case. 16
Three Wyoming cases 17 have dealt with the general subject at hand.
None of the cases are directly in point, nor do they specifically place the
burden of securing a speedy trial on either side, but there is some note8
worthy language in the opinions relative to the issue. The first case'
held that the defendant's conviction, sentence, and imprisonment on one
indictment was not a sufficient excuse for not bringing him to trial on
another indictment; that the right to a speedy trial is not suspended while
one is serving a penitentiary sentence. Thus the defendant was discharged,
under the statute, because the state delayed bringing him to trial on the
second charge until he had served a four year penitentiary sentence resulting from the first charge. The court emphasized that the statutory
provision' 9 was enacted in order to make the constitutional guaranty of a
speedy trial effective, and that the statute is a legislative declaration of
what is a reasonable delay in bringing the accused to trial. Thus, because
the statute does involve the important right to a speedy trial, it should
be construed and applied liberally in favor of the defendant. In the
second case 20 the court interpreted the delay permitted by the statute so
as not to include the term at which the defendant was indicted. The
13.
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Flanary v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 204, 35 S.E.2d 135 (1945).
Zehrlaut v. State, 230 Ind. 175, 102 N.E.2d 203 (1951).
State v. Chadwick, 150 Ore. 645, 47 P.2d 232 (1935).
Ex Parte Chalfant, 81 W.Va. 93, 93 S.E. 1032 (1917).
State v. Keefe, 17 Wyo. 227, 98 Pac. 122 (1908); State v. Levand, 37 Wyo. 372, 262
Pac. 24 (1927); City of Casper v. Wagner, 284 P.2d 409 (Wyo. 1955).
State v. Keefe, 17 Wyo. 227, 98 Pac. 122 (1908).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 10-131.2 (1945).
State v. Levand, 37 Wyo. 372, 262 Pac. 24 (1927).
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third case 21 involved a defendant convicted in the municipal court of
driving a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor which
was in violation of a city ordinance. The defendant gave notice of appeal
and then two years later filed a motion for dismissal on the grounds that
the prosecution failed to diligently prosecute his appeal. The court held
that the statutory provision for discharge of the defendant for undue delay
in bringing him to trial, cannot be invoked by the defendant because he
has had one speedy trial and was convicted thereat. The court said further
that because the defendant did not diligently prosecute his appeal it
should be dismissed.
Weighing the various considerations, it would seem preferable that
the obligation for securing a speedy trial in Wyoming should be placed
on the prosecution. The Wyoming statutes, 22 significantly use the language
"if any person ... shall not be brought to trial . . . he shall be entitled to
be discharged." The words "be brought" would infer that the trial must
be brought by the prosecution, thus placing the burden there. By putting
the burden on the prosecution there is no undue hardship, since the state
should desire to bring the defendant speedily to trial while its evidence is
fresh. It comports more with the general spirit of our criminal system,
as indicated by such doctrines as the presumption of innocence, to place the
burden of securing a speedy trial on the prosecution.
The statutes of New York and Indiana 23 are somewhat similar to the
Wyoming statutes on speedy trial. The decisions of the New York and
Indiana courts24 seem well reasoned, and should be followed.
WILLIAM W.

GRANT

MOTOR VEHICLE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE IN WYOMING
Wyoming is one of the 35 states that has some form of certificate of
title act. Although all of the 48 states require some sort of registration of
motor vehicles, some 13 states have no certificate of title act of any kind.
Of the states having such an act, many are inadequate and very few are
similar, resulting in a lack of uniformity, in form and substance. Such
21.
22.
23.

24.

City of Casper v. Wagner, 284 P.2d 409 (Wyo. 1955).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 10-1312, § 10-1313 (1945).
N.Y. Code Cr. Proc. § 668 (1939): "If a defendant, indicted for a crime whose
trial has not been postponed upon his application, be not brought to trial at the
next term of the court in which the indictment is triable, after it is found the
court may, on application of the defendant, order the indictment to be dismissed,
unless good cause to the contrary be shown."
Ind. Stat. § 9-1403 (Burns' Replacement 1956): "No person shall be held by
recognizance to answer an indictment or affidavit without trial for a period embracing more than three terms of court, not including the term at which a
recognizance was first taken thereon, if taken in term time; but he shall be discharged unless a continuance be had upon his own motion, or the delay be caused
by his act, or there be not sufficient time to try him at such third term; and, in
the latter case, if he be not brought to trial at such third term, he shall be discharged, except as provided in the next section."
Zehrlaut v. State, 230 Ind. 175, 102 N.E.2d 203 (1951); People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y.
353, 130 N.E.2d 891 (1955).

